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REVERSE THE CURSE: CREATING A FRAMEWORK TO
MITIGATE THE RESOURCE CURSE AND PROMOTE HUMAN
RIGHTS IN MINERAL EXTRACTION INDUSTRIES IN
AFRICA
INTRODUCTION
The continent of Africa is one of economic paradox: Abundant natural
resources lie within many of the states, yet despite their mineral wealth, these
same states exhibit low levels of development and a poor standard of living.
Resources that seemingly should benefit African states have instead been the
impetus for their stagnant development. Historically, the beneficiaries of these
vast mineral deposits have not been the African populations but rather
foreigners such as the colonial powers in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries,1 exploitative corporations during the post-WWII neocolonial era,2
and opportunistic military strongmen involved in Africa’s civil and crossborder wars.3 The revenue that these resource caches produce is more often
than not funneled to external entities, such as an international corporation or a
few elites within a state.4
This phenomenon is generally known as the Resource Curse. Many
economic and political models have been put forth to attempt to explain why
countries with mineral and other resource wealth are often those with the
lowest rate of growth and how to remedy this situation. This is known as the
Resource Curse theory.5 However, while the Resource Curse theory explains
developmental problems related to rent-seeking and revenue transparency, it
does so from a backward-looking viewpoint—it seeks to remedy the causes of
1 Ehiedu E.G. Iwereibor, The Colonization of Africa, AFRICANA AGE, http://exhibitions.nypl.org/
africanaage/essay-colonization-of-africa.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2014).
2 Joy Asongazoh Alemazung, Post-Colonial Colonialism: An Analysis of International Factors and
Actors Marring African Socio-Economic and Political Development, 3 J. PAN AFR. STUD. 62, 69–70 (2010).
3 Factbox- Sierra Leone’s Civil War, REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2007, 2:05 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/
2007/08/02/uk-leone-warcrimes-war-idUKL0286217420070802.
4 See Joseph Stiglitz, Africa’s Natural Resources Can Be a Blessing, Not an Economic Curse,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 6, 2012, 7:51 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/economics-blog/2012/aug/06/africanatural-resources-economic-curse.
5 Resource Curse is being used as a general term to represent the various theories on the subject; it is
comprised of many different variations, including rentier state and Dutch Disease models. For a more in-depth
discussion on some of these models, see Jonathan Di John, Is There Really a Resource Curse? A Critical
Survey of Theory and Evidence, 17 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 167 (2011).
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the problem by identifying the economic and institutional factors contributing
to the problem.6
Therefore, while the Resource Curse theory can help academics,
economists, and politicians craft policies to spur development within these
resource-rich states, the theory does not provide ways to mitigate the negative
human capital consequences that often attend the phenomenon. As much of the
resource wealth in African states is mineral-based, this means abuses of human
rights that occur during the extraction process itself for the purposes of this
Comment.7 Although development brings better infrastructure and higher
standards of living to a state, the human rights abuses at the extraction level
cannot be ameliorated by the developmental considerations prescribed by the
Resource Curse theory alone.
The diamond industry in Africa prompted the investigation of human rights
issues being brought to the forefront in Resource Curse situations after the
conflicts in Sierra Leone and Angola.8 However, there are other mineral
industries that are tainted by human rights abuses during extraction. Some of
them take place under the growing eyes of Chinese corporations on the
continent, especially cobalt and copper mining; unfortunately, many of the
abuses are not brought to the attention of the international community.9
Over the past decade, China has become one of the biggest investors in
Africa, especially in the extractive resources business.10 As China’s presence
on the continent increases, complaints regarding mistreatment of workers, poor
health and safety conditions, and occasional violence have arisen.11 This is
largely due to the fact that Chinese companies use Chinese nationals as their
managerial staff and other higher-ups, leaving only the manual labor jobs for

6

See Stiglitz, supra note 4.
What is meant by “human rights” in this context is discussed in Part III.D.
8 See Girish Gupta & Santa Elana, Not Just Out of Africa: South America’s “Blood Diamonds”
Network, TIME (Aug. 20, 2012), http://world.time.com/2012/08/20/not-just-out-of-africa-south-americasblood-diamonds-network; see also About–KP Basics, KIMBERLEYPROCESS.COM, http://www.
kimberleyprocess.com/en/about (last visited Jan. 1, 2014).
9 Shen Hu & Han Wei, China’s Harsh Squeeze in Zambia’s Copper Belt, CAIXIN ONLINE (Nov. 10,
2011, 9:16 PM), http://english.caixin.com/2011-11-10/100324752.html.
10 China in Africa, INST. DEVELOPING ECON.—JAPAN EXTERNAL TRADE ORG., http://www.ide.go.jp/
English/Data/Africa_file/Manualreport/cia_08.html.
11 David Smith, Chinese Mining Firms in Zambia Under Fire for Mistreating Workers, GUARDIAN (Nov.
3, 2011, 6:01 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2011/nov/03/chinese-mining-zambiamistreating-workers.
7
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the local population, fostering a clash of cultures.12 Cobalt and copper, which
are used in mobile phone batteries, electronic wiring, and other components,
are especially important for China’s fast-growing electronics manufacturing
sector.13
The human rights abuses and related transparency issues in these two
expanding industries will continue to go unchecked unless the extractive
process is under scrutiny by institutions other than the state and corporate
entity overseeing mining operations. A strong international framework is
needed to act as watchdog. This framework will be most effective if it is a
partnership between industry, governments, and community organizations.
This kind of tripartite framework, in the form of the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme,14 helped stop the flow of conflict diamonds from Africa
at the beginning of the millennium.15 However, this new framework must not
only ensure that these minerals are not mined to support conflict, but also that
they are being extracted in an environment that puts an emphasis on protecting
the rights of the miners, increases transparency throughout the process, and is
enforceable against noncompliance.
This Comment will focus on creating an international framework that
would ensure mineral extraction comports with international notions of human
rights in a way that holds all actors accountable and can enforce its provisions
with teeth when violations arise. Part I will explain the creation, successes, and
failures of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and will touch on other
similar frameworks that seek to remedy the ills that accompany natural
resource extraction. Part II will discuss China’s rise in Africa, how China
conducts its dealings with the continent, and its involvement in the cobalt and
copper industries. It will also detail the troubled record of the Chinese
extractive industry both in Africa and back home in comparison to Australia,
another rising mining presence in Africa. Part III will outline a suggested
blueprint for protecting human rights, encouraging transparency, and
12

Hu & Wei, supra note 9.
Copper & Cobalt Facts, SHALINA RESOURCES, http://www.shalinaresources.com/copper-cobalt-facts.
aspx (last visited Jan. 9, 2014); see also China in Africa, supra note 10, at 45.
14 The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme was developed in the early 2000s to stem the illegal trade
in conflict diamonds (also known as blood diamonds) that helped support the civil wars in Sierra Leone and
Angola. See About–KP Basics, supra note 8.
15 Shingirai Maparura, To Certify or Not to Certify? Zimbabwe’s Diamond Trade Under Question,
CONSULTANCY AFR. INTELLIGENCE (July 16, 2010, 8:00 AM), http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=477:to-certify-or-not-to-certify-zimbabwes-diamond-trade-underquestion&catid=57:africa-watch-discussion-papers&Itemid=263.
13
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effectively reigning in noncompliance in the targeted extraction industries. To
achieve this goal, this new framework will have to combine the successful
aspects of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme with the structures that
subsequent frameworks have established (e.g., customizable standards and
procedures), ground itself in principles of international law to make it
enforceable internationally, and introduce some novel ideas to the international
mineral regulatory regime.
I. THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS: AN EFFECTIVE, YET FLAWED, FRAMEWORK
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (“KPCS”) was established
largely in response to the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Angola and the
proliferation of conflict diamonds16 that sustained the two conflicts.17 The
magnitude of the atrocities committed by the various fighting factions and the
effect on all levels of society prompted states and industry leaders to establish
a new type of international framework to ensure that diamonds were not used
to support armed conflict ever again. The KPCS has been very successful in
lowering the trade of conflict diamonds, but in recent years has come across
problems maintaining a strict enforcement of its system. Soon after its
implementation, other systems similar to the KPCS emerged to attempt to fill
in the blind spots of the KPCS. Despite its failures, the legacy of the KPCS
should not be minimized.
A. Sierra Leone and the Public Eye
The civil war in Sierra Leone began in 1991 when Foday Sankoh, a former
corporal in the army, created the Revolutionary United Front (“RUF”) to
overthrow President Momoh.18 The war lasted until 2002, claiming over
50,000 lives and involving an incalculable number of inhumane acts.19
Although popular sentiment in the African state turned against the RUF early
on, the insurgents were still able to carry on their mission for more than a
decade due to their control of the diamond mines in the country.20

16

Blood diamonds, or conflict diamonds, are diamonds used to finance wars and other armed conflict.
See Factbox, supra note 3.
17 See id.; see also Maparura, supra note 15.
18 Factbox, supra note 3.
19 The RUF committed murder, rape, mutilation, and used child soldiers. Id.
20 Id.
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The war lasted as long as it did because, in addition to the world’s
reluctance to intervene, the rebels had considerable aid from Charles Taylor in
neighboring Liberia. Taylor helped smuggle arms to the rebels while his own
forces crossed the border to help commit the atrocities that the RUF carried
out.21 Taylor was the leader of his own rebel group in Liberia, the National
Patriotic Front of Liberia (“NPFL”).22 Taylor and the NPFL armed the RUF in
return for diamonds, which were abundant throughout the southeast of Sierra
Leone.23 The NPFL and RUF were able to take control of the diamond mines
early during the conflict and used the proceeds of sales to acquire weapons.24
The sale of diamonds enabled the rebel groups to continue their bloodshed
once public favor for their cause all but vanished.25 During the armed conflict,
there was no global system to track diamonds from extraction to market and so
foreign distributors had no idea the diamonds they handled were coming from
war-torn Sierra Leone via Liberia; this lack of oversight facilitated the
diamonds-for-arms trade that was the lifeline of the RUF throughout the
conflict.
Once the atrocities and circumstances surrounding the production of Sierra
Leonean diamonds reached the world community’s collective conscious, these
diamonds became known as blood, or conflict, diamonds.26 The prevalent use
of child soldiers by Taylor, the NPFL, and the RUF was not limited to fighting
and committing war crimes, but included mining the diamonds in hazardous
and often fatal conditions; the blood spilt by these children both during
extraction and the fighting the diamonds sustained led to the popular
nomenclature.27 The horrific civil war helped push conflict diamonds to the
forefront of the public eye and the need to better police the sale of diamonds
worldwide.

21 Id.; see also Who Is Charles Taylor, OPEN SOC. JUST. INITIATIVE, http://www.charlestaylortrial.org/
trial-background/who-is-charles-taylor (last visited Jan. 9, 2014).
22 Who Is Charles Taylor, supra note 21.
23 Factbox, supra note 3.
24 Ben Brumfield, Charles Taylor Sentenced to 50 Years for War Crimes, CNN (May 30, 2012), http://
www.cnn.com/2012/05/30/world/africa/netherlands-taylor-sentencing/index.html.
25 See Factbox, supra note 3.
26 Brumfield, supra note 24; see also Factbox, supra note 3.
27 Brumfield, supra note 24.

BURTON GALLEYSPROOFS3

430

8/6/2014 9:15 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

B. Angola and the International Community’s Mobilization
The Angolan civil war began during the war for independence in 1961 and
continued until 2002.28 The three major fighting factions were the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola, the National Union for Total
Independence of Angola (“UNITA”), and National Liberation Front of Angola;
all three vied for power during the country’s war for independence and
continued their conflict throughout the long civil war after formal
independence.29 Throughout the 1980s, the civil war was largely one of the
many proxy wars of the Cold War, both sides being backed by either the
United States or the Soviet Union; however, despite the end of the Cold War
the conflict continued through the early 2000s.30 By the end of 2002, more than
500,000 people had perished during the conflict.31 As was the case in Sierra
Leone, the conflict in Angola was prolonged through funding from diamond
revenues.32
During the civil war, UNITA held control over the diamond mines in
Angola and consequently became the de facto government authority, trading
over $3.7 billion worth of conflict diamonds from 1992 to 1998.33 The
importance of diamond extraction to the civil war was not lost on the United
Nations, who recognized what was happening and took action, albeit late in the
conflict.34 In 1998, the United Nations placed the UNITA government under
sanctions with the goal of ceasing the armed conflict by using pressure from
the international community.35 After an UN-mandated report, known as the
Fowler Report, revealed that diamond sales predominantly supported the
UNITA government’s reign, and that violations of the sanctions were
commonplace, Security Council Resolutions 1173 and 1176, which banned
diamond purchases from Angola, were passed,.36 The United Nations reasoned
that choking the financial lifeline of UNITA would force it to give up power

28 Lucinda Saunders, Note, Rich and Rare Are the Gems They War: Holding De Beers Accountable for
Trading Conflict Diamonds, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1402, 1417 (2001); The Angolan Civil War: The Concept
of “Blood Diamonds” Explained, UGS ANGL., http://www.ugs-angola.com/the-angolan-civil-war-the-conceptof-blood-diamonds-explained.php (last visited Jan. 9, 2014).
29 Saunders, supra note 28, at 1417−20; The Angolan Civil War, supra note 28.
30 The Angolan Civil War, supra note 28.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Maparura, supra note 15.
36 Id.; see also The Angolan Civil War, supra note 28.
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and speedily end the conflict. However, despite the sanctions, UNITA was still
able to smuggle conflict diamonds out of the country to support its efforts.37
While Charles Taylor was helping the Sierra Leonean rebels sell their
diamonds through Liberian markets and dealers, the Angolan rebel factions
had a much more direct route to the market through De Beers, which had a
near-monopoly on the world’s diamond supply.38 Throughout the 1990s, De
Beers directly purchased diamonds from UNITA. Human Rights Watch placed
the figure around $760 million, approximately a fifth of UNITA’s revenue
throughout the decade.39 Even after the sanctions were promulgated in 1998,
De Beers continued to purchase Angolan diamonds: whether they did so
knowingly is still being debated.40
Regardless of De Beers’ intent, its involvement in Angola and indirect
purchases of Sierra Leonean diamonds showed the world that policing the
States themselves would not be enough to curb the proliferation of conflict
diamonds. Even companies as powerful as De Beers, who had a virtual
monopoly worldwide, could not be sure that the diamonds they were
purchasing were completely conflict-free.41 Diamonds needed to be tracked
from extraction to market, meaning that both states and industry leaders had to
be involved in policing and held accountable for the proliferation of conflict
diamonds.
C. Creation of the KPCS
In response to the failed UN sanctions in Angola, a group of southern
African diamond-producing states met in Kimberley, South Africa in 2000.42
There, the states agreed to establish an international standard of trading only
37

The Angolan Civil War, supra note 28.
Saunders, supra note 28.
39 Id.; see also Vikki Kratz, Is Your Engagement Ring Funding a War?, ALTERNET (Mar. 31, 2000),
http://www.alternet.org/story/318/is_your_engagement_ring_funding_a_civil_war.
40 Kratz, supra note 39. De Beers’s control of the diamond trade was possible through its ownership of
mines, purchase of as many diamonds from the open market as possible, and its many subsidiaries; the use of
subsidiaries suggests that De Beers’s actual contribution to the UNITA diamond trade was higher than a fifth
of total sales. Patricia O’Connell, The Issue: De Beers’ Multifaceted Strategy Shift, BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 6,
2009), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2009-01-06/the-issue-de-beers-multifaceted-strategy-shiftbusin
essweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice; Saunders, supra note 28. De Beers’s widereaching diamond acquisition strategy was the reason the company bought from the Angolan rebels before the
sanctions were in place and from sources illegally trading Angolan diamonds after the sanctions. Id. De
Beers’s oversight, if any, was weakened by its sheer number of sources. Id
41 Id.; see also Kratz, supra note 39.
42 Maparura, supra note 15.
38
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conflict-free diamonds.43 The United Nations supported the Kimberley
proposal with a resolution in the General Assembly later that year stating its
approval of the creation of such an international framework.44 By 2002,
negotiations between states, civil society organizations, and the diamond
industry succeeded in creating the KPCS.45
The KPCS entered into force in 2003.46 States, industry leaders, and civil
society organizations are part of the KPCS, jointly policing the diamond
industry in a tripartite framework.47 There are currently fifty-four sovereign
participants signed onto the KPCS, and because the European Union is
considered as one participant, the KPCS has eighty-one total state
participants.48 The World Diamond Council largely represents the diamond
industry in the KPCS, while Global Witness,49 KPCS’s largest NGO member,
and Partnership Africa Canada represent civil society.50
The KPCS represents over ninety-nine percent of the world’s diamond
producers, effectively giving the KPCS the ability to monitor the entire world’s
diamond industry.51 Though the UN plays no formal role in the
implementation of the KPCS, it does officially renew its support of the
framework annually.52 The cooperation between state governments, civil
society organizations, and the diamond industry allows the KPCS to involve
nearly all of the invested actors of the diamond trade, from extraction to
market.53
D. Structure and Successes of the KPCS
The KPCS is not an international organization per se; instead, aided by
both industry and civil society, it relies on its state participants to self-police
through national legislation 54 It is not a legal international agreement or treaty
43

Id.
Id.
45 About–KP Basics, supra note 8.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Global Witness withdrew in 2011. See infra Part I.F.
50 Frequently Asked Questions, KIMBERLY PROCESS, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/faq (last
visited Feb. 20, 2014).
51 About–KP Basics, supra note 8.
52 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 64/109, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/109 (Mar. 2, 2010).
53 About–KP Basics, supra note 8.
54 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 50.
44
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either Rather, it is implemented through the national legislatures, each state
doing so independently of one another.55 While state participants enforce the
KPCS through their legislatures, the non-state participants do their part by
providing technical and administrative support.56 Only suppliers must be
KPCS-approved; individual retail jewelers do not need KPCS approval.57
Participant suppliers can only purchase diamonds accompanied by a KPCS
certificate issued by the authorities of both the importing and exporting states.
These certificates state that the diamonds within that particular shipment are
conflict-free, have been approved by the exporting state, and may be exported
only to those states that have acceded to, and complied with, the KPCS.58
Twice a year, the participants and observers of the KPCS meet to discuss
its implementation.59 Working groups of states monitor its implementation,
accept new members, discuss the technical aspects of the scheme, and
generally ensure that the KPCS is running smoothly.60 To become a participant
of the KPCS, a state must be able to certify that the diamonds meet KPCS
standards for KPCS participant suppliers.61 Furthermore, participants must
pass national legislation supporting the goals of the KPCS, create institutions
to further those goals, establish import and export controls related to the
diamond trade, and commit to a transparency and exchange of statistical data.62
One state chairs the KPCS Secretariat on a rotating basis and oversees the
framework as a whole.63 The combination of governmental, civil society, and
industry efforts has yielded impressive results in the short time of the KPCS’s
operation.64 By 2009, the KPCS succeeded in lowering the sales of conflict
diamonds from their 1990s level of fifteen percent of the world’s diamond
trade to merely 0.4 percent.65 The legal diamond market has greatly expanded
thanks to the KPCS. Sierra Leone’s diamond revenue has grown from virtually
55

Id.
Participants are the state actors, while observers are made up of the various civil society organizations
and industry actors. Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. Polished diamonds do not need a certificate. Id.
59 See, e.g., April 2012 Working Group Publication Summaries, KIMBERLY PROCESS (July 28, 2013, 1:17
PM), http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/april-2012-working-group-public-summaries-0.
60 About-KP Basics, supra note 8.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. To date, South Africa, Canada, Russia, Botswana, the EU, India, Namibia, Israel, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, and most recently, the United States have chaired the KPCS. Id.
64 Id.
65 Maparura, supra note 15.
56
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zero during the civil war to $125 million in 2006 and already $102 million just
in the first half of 2013.66
Two successful cases of self-policing occurred: when Israel expelled one of
its Diamond Exchange’s members in 2010 for importing Zimbabwean
diamonds while the latter country was under a ban by the KPCS; and when the
Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”), in order to avoid criticism for
noncompliance with the KPCS, voluntarily suspended its trade due to its
inability to effectively stop illegal trading.67 This is the system working as
envisaged.
E. Shortcomings of the KPCS
Although the KPCS has been largely successful in its mission, it is far from
perfect. The KPCS lacks a central authority and any enforcement organ
independent of the participants’ own governments.68 Any action taken by the
KPCS requires unanimous consent, which makes any proposed resolution
tough to act upon, Moreover, the rotating nature of the Secretariat is also an
obstacle to achieving consistency in governance and policy.69 The non-binding
nature of the KPCS regulations furthers this enforcement problem, because
compliance is voluntary and any action taken by the KPCS is not backed by
international law binding or persuasive.70
Consequently, countries such as the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe, and
Venezuela have continued exporting conflict diamonds despite varying degrees
of noncompliancez.71 Côte d’Ivoire is currently under UN sanctions for its
trade in conflict diamonds during its present civil war and is now suspended
from participation in the KPCS after no action from the KPCS could quell the
illegal trade.72 Zimbabwe and Venezuela are discussed in detail below.

66 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 51; see also Christo Johnson, Sierra Leone Diamond Exports
up 43 Pct in First Half of 2013, REUTERS (Aug. 16, 2013, 7:45 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/
16/sierraleone-diamonds-exports-idUSL6N0GB0D120130816.
67 Israeli Diamond Trader Banned for ‘Blood Diamond’ Link, BBC NEWS (Dec. 29, 2010, 8:08 AM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12088658; Maparura, supra note 15.
68 Maparura, supra note 15.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. The DRC eventually removed itself from the KPCS. Id.
72 KP Participants and Observers, KIMBERLY PROCESS, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/web/
kimberley-process/kp-participants-and-observers (last visited Jan. 9, 2014); see also Maparura, supra note 15.
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1. Zimbabwe: Opaque State-Run Mines
One interesting example of the shortcomings of the KPCS is Zimbabwe’s
continued KPCS-violating exports, especially those from the Marange
diamond fields.73 While the KPCS banned imports from, and exports to,
Zimbabwe in 2009 due to reports relating to military control of the diamond
mines, the KPCS reinstated Zimbabwe in late 2011 after reassessment.74
Zimbabwe’s 2009 suspension, based on allegations of the military controlling
the mines and funneling revenues to President Robert Mugabe’s Zanu-PF
party, was not challenged by the state at the time.75 The violations were not
limited to the military control as human rights groups claimed that workers
were not only physically beaten at the Marange mines, but that some were
conscripted to work there.76 Though it did not bring the violations to light on
its own accord, Zimbabwe did accept its temporary ban and soon sought
reinstatement, citing improved conditions at its mines.77 Both the European
Union and the United States attempted to block Zimbabwe’s reinstatement to
the KPCS when talks were held in 2011.78
Zimbabwe’s exports were considered conflict diamonds because the
proceeds going to President Mugabe supported his violent, dissent-eradicating
regime and thus ran afoul of the KPCS standards.79 Furthermore, Zimbabwe
did not report the incidents at the mines nor did it reveal where the revenue
was going, which was a breakdown in the self-policing facet of the KPCS.80
Zimbabwe also continued to export its conflict diamonds, which under the
KPCS should have ceased once the KPCS took action.
While the KPCS deemed that the allegations that brought the temporary
suspension were remedied,81 there are still problems with the operation of the

73

Maparura, supra note 15.
Kimberley Process: Zimbabwe Diamond Exports Approved, BBC NEWS (Nov. 2, 2011, 9:34 AM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15554609. The Zimbabwean government co-owns Marange
Resources while it co-owns another company with the Chinese government; these two companies are currently
exporting diamonds from the controversial Marange mines. Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 See id.
78 See id.
79 While the conflict these diamonds supported was not a civil war, the Mugabe regime still used the
revenue to violently crack down during elections and at other times. See Maparura, supra note 15.
80 See Kimberley Process, supra note 74.
81 See Marange Diamonds: Zimbabwe Denies “Torture Camp”, BBC NEWS (Aug. 9, 2011, 1:47 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14468116 (discussing allegations of whippings, dog maulings, death
74
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mines. There have been contracts awarded to companies with little to no
experience in diamond mining. More often than not, these companies had
connections to the Zimbabwean government.82 These companies receive very
favorable concessions and have not been able to adequately prove where the
diamonds they are exporting are coming from within Zimbabwe.83
Furthermore, the actual owners of many of these companies are unknown; this,
combined with a $2 billion annual yield of diamonds,84 results in little
guarantee of the circumstances surrounding extraction and even less
accountability.85 Without such proof, the KPCS’s certification becomes
meaningless. Zimbabwe approves these diamonds in spite of the inability to
ensure conflict-free extraction.
The lack of transparency in the process enables the state to funnel revenue
back into itself, as well as to the companies running the mines, with no
watchdog stopping them. Though the KPCS does require some sort of
transparency in the national legislation of its participants, it is not sufficient to
preclude corruption in revenue distribution because states that do not want to
fully comply generally will not police themselves within the KPCS.
Even after taking the mining fields from the police forces that oversaw
them, under state control, there have been reports of underage child miners,
severe beatings, and even wrongful death suits against the companies.86
Zimbabwe has even exported diamonds to Mozambique, a state currently not a
member of the KPCS and so in further violation of the KPCS.87 To accomplish
this, Zimbabwe is exporting its diamonds through unregulated ports, making it
difficult to ensure workers are treated humanely. The most egregious
allegation, however, is the report of mass rapes by soldiers at the mines.88
The KPCS has minimum standards in determining whether diamonds are
conflict-free, but, according to the KPCS Secretariat, Zimbabwe is in a strange
position of meeting the KPCS standards while extracting the diamonds in an
cover-ups by military personnel, mock drownings, and rape). Representatives from the KPCS visited the mines
in 2010 and though finding sub-par conditions, determined there was significant progress. Id.
82 Mugabe Man Cashes in on Diamond Fields, MAIL & GUARDIAN (Sept. 7, 2012), http://mg.co.za/
article/2012-09-07-00-mugabe-man-cashes-in-on-diamond-fields.
83 See id.
84 Jason Moyo, Murky World of Marange Mining Firms, MAIL & GUARDIAN (July 6, 2012, 7:13 AM),
http://mg.co.za/article/2012-07-05-murky-world-of-marange-mining-firms/.
85 See Mugabe Man Cashes in on Diamond Fields, supra note 82.
86 Id.
87 See id.
88 Id.
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environment allegedly full of human rights abuses.89 Only a stronger
regulatory framework can prevent situations like that in Zimbabwe. The
Mugabe regime is endangering the state and flouting the authority of the
KPCS, all the while using diamond revenue to keep itself above the
hyperinflation that is so rampant in Zimbabwe.90 Proper distribution of
diamond revenue is integral to further development. A truly international and
legally binding framework is needed to prevent Zimbabwe’s government from
this abuse of its resources. Otherwise, Zimbabwe will continue to profit from
its diamond trade. This is a tragedy as neither Zimbabwe nor the legitimacy of
the KPCS benefit from the current situation.91
2. Venezuela: Unregulated and Unmonitored
Another example of the KPCS’s failure is Venezuela. Although the country
voluntarily removed itself from the KPCS in 2008, it was largely the result of
the inability of the KPCS to enforce compliance in a legally binding manner.92
The state is still considered a member, albeit one on probation.93 This situation
shows that a state can continue to export inhumanely-mined diamonds,
whether under the KPCS’s framework or while suspended. Thus, if a state does
not want to comply, it will not. Venezuela exported conflict diamonds via
Guyana using falsified KPCS certificates stating the shipments were legally
mined, marketed, and generally in compliance with KPCS standards.94
Venezuela did little to ensure that diamond extraction was regulated, a clear
abdication of its responsibilities to ensure compliance with the KPCS within its
borders.95 For Venezuela, forging certificates while participating in the KPCS
was no different than exporting its diamonds to whomever it wanted without
going through the motions of compliance and thus withdrew from the KPCS.
Continuance of this conduct may result in Venezuela’s expulsion from the
KPCS—something Global Witness had called for in recent years96—but as of
the writing of this Comment, the state is still only temporarily suspended.97

89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

See id.
See id.
See id.
KP Participants and Observers, supra note 72.
See id.
Gupta & Elana, supra note 8.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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In addition to fabricating certificates, Venezuela has not submitted its
required annual reports about diamond exports and imports for many years.98
Though it has started producing these reports recently, they are usually filed
late and almost always substantively insufficient.99
As for human rights abuses, child miners are used exclusively in the mines
near Icabarú, one of many mines whose yields are untraced from extraction to
market.100 Venezuela does not seem concerned with tracking the mine deposits
or ensuring that extraction is taking place in an ethical manner.101 There is
nothing the KPCS can do other than expel Venezuela from the KPCS; even
then the state will face no impediment to continuing its illicit trade as there is
no binding international law backing the actions of the KPCS.
Venezuela has some of the biggest deposits of diamonds in the world, and
smugglers make millions of dollars every year from the state’s failure to follow
KPCS protocols.102 Even the smugglers have learned to not worry about
reprisals from the authorities—whether KPCS or state—and engage in the
illicit trade regardless of the unregulated dangers. One smuggler claimed that
the ever-present violence and high risk of death in the illegal diamond trade is
something he must deal with to make a living.103 For him there is no longer a
legitimate diamond trade in which to engage and nothing to ensure he can
make a humane living.104
F. Alternatives to the KPCS
The situations in Zimbabwe and Venezuela highlight some of the
institutional problems with the KPCS. If non-compliance issues were not
substantial enough, Global Witness withdrew from the KPCS in 2011 in
response to the situations in Zimbabwe and Côte d’Ivoire.105 In 2009, an
official with Partnership Africa Canada, another NGO that is a major part of
the KPCS, resigned from the organization, claiming that the KPCS was quickly
turning into a “toothless League of Nations.”106 Adding to this, the continuing

98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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civil war in Côte d’Ivoire, the violence in Venezuela, and Zimbabwe’s liminal
behavior show that the consequences of a framework with insufficient
enforcement are dire. However, since the creation of the KPCS, several new
organizations have been created to attempt to solve the problems that the
KPCS faces in enforcement. Each of them provides blueprints for a more
effective framework.
1. The Responsible Jewellery Council
The Responsible Jewellery Council (“RJC”) is an organization consisting
of large companies from the mining sector and the retail sector of the gold and
diamond industries.107 There are more than 400 members, but unlike the
KPCS, states are not involved.108 RJC seeks to have its members meet certain
ethical, social, and environmental criteria.109 The environmental factor brings a
new concern under the extraction framework purview. RJC uses a third-party
independent auditor to determine compliance, rather than having an internal
enforcement organ like the KPCS’s monitoring system.110 This ensures that the
shortfalls of self-policing in the KPCS are not encountered, but there is a
weakness in the monitoring of the minerals in that the RJC framework does not
have the mandatory chain of custody procedures that the KPCS has.111
Additionally, a third-party auditor should help lower the risk of corruption
of an extraction framework. However, it lacks an extraction-to-market
assurance of human rights protections due to the lack of state involvement.
National governmental resources are necessary in regard to import and export
controls and RJC loses out on the more localized authority of municipal
governments where extraction takes place. Local authorities have the ability to

107

SHAWN BLORE & IAN SMILLIE, TAMING THE RESOURCE CURSE: IMPLEMENTING THE ICGLR
CERTIFICATION MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT-PRONE MINERALS 20 (2011), available at http://www.pacweb.org/
Documents/icglr/PAC_Report_on_ICGLR_RCM-03-2011-eng.pdf.
108 Members, RESPONSIBLE JEWELLERY COUNCIL, http://www.responsiblejewellery.com/members (last
visited Oct. 14, 2013).
109 Id.
110 See RESPONSIBLE JEWELLERY COUNCIL, http://www.responsiblejewellery.com (last visited Oct. 14,
2013).
111 Chain-of-Custody Certification, RESPONSIBLE JEWELLERY COUNCIL, http://www.responsiblejewellery.
com/chain-of-custody-certification (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). This procedure entails stringent requirements
that must be met in each stage of the extraction-to-market progression; failure to meet requirements in one
stage can halt the shipment until the problems are rectified. See RESPONSIBLE JEWELLERY COUNCIL, CHAINOF-CUSTODY (COC) STANDARD 7 (2012), available at http://www.responsiblejewellery.com/files/S002_2012_
RJC_CoC_Standard_PM.pdf.
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keep tabs on daily mining practices and respond quicker to reported human
rights abuses.
2. The Diamond Development Initiative
The Diamond Development Initiative (“DDI”) seeks to build upon the
KPCS by fostering an environment that leads to economic development not
just for the state as a whole, but also for the miners and their communities
through the collaboration of civil society and the diamond industry.112
Partnership Africa Canada, an observer with the KPCS, is also involved with
DDI.113 DDI operates in collaboration with the KPCS as well.114 DDI focuses
largely on the plight of artisanal and alluvial (surface diamonds) miners,
attempting to put in place regulations that will give laborers a better share of
the revenue from their efforts outside of large mining companies.115 DDI
works with the KPCS’s Working Group on Artisanal and Alluvial Production;
however, both Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe are members of the Working
Group.116 Thus, DDI’s effectiveness in the KPCS is limited because it works
closely with states that currently do not comply with the KPCS.
The organization’s main goals are greater transparency, open markets, and
greater organization in the artisanal and alluvial industries.117 In November
2011, DDI and RJC partnered to advance each of their goals.118 Each
organization became a member of the other to ensure greater cooperation to
achieve improved social, environmental, and labor practices.119 The joint
venture will seek governmental and intergovernmental sponsors for its
projects, a move that will enable both organizations to better ensure ethical
mining.120 Using state entities as sponsors avoids the KPCS’s problem of self-

112

Diamond Development Initiative Builds on Kimberley, INT’L DIAMOND EXCHANGE (Apr. 1, 2007, 6:28
AM), http://www.idexonline.com/portal_FullNews.asp?id=27291.
113 Id.
114 See Kimberley Process Development Agenda, DIAMOND DEV. INITIATIVE, http://www.ddiglobal.org/
pages/projects-kimberley-process-development-agenda.php (last visited Oct. 6, 2013).
115 DDII Mission Statement, DIAMOND DEV. INITIATIVE, http://www.ddiglobal.org/pages/mission.php
(last visited Oct. 16, 2013).
116 Kimberley Process Development Agenda, supra note 114.
117 Id.
118 Diamond Development Initiative International (DDII) and Responsible Jewellery Council (RJC)
Announce Working Relationship on Artisanal Diamond Production, DIAMOND DEV. INITIATIVE (Nov. 16,
2011, 3:00 PM), available at http://www.ddiglobal.org/login/Upload/News-Release-DDII-RJC_MOU.pdf.
119 Id.
120 See id.
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policing by corrupt states but adds the benefit of having a localized authority
and the resources of governments at the ready.
DDI would be more effective in a framework that has an enforcement
mechanism, as attempting to promote transparency in resource extraction will
fail if there are no consequences to noncompliance. The sponsor aspect
promotes compliance: if states are stakeholders as sponsors who have
committed resources, they are more invested in the success of the framework
than if they were merely participants subject to oversight.
3. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
Perhaps the best KPCS-type framework for protecting human rights is the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (“EITI”), a global framework that
promotes revenue transparency at the local level of production.121 Like the
KPCS, EITI is a tripartite collaboration between states, industry, and civil
society that places responsibility of implementation in the hands of the
states.122 The EITI standard is implemented in the oil, gas, and mining
industries and therefore provides a relevant model.123 EITI was established in
2003 via a Statement of Principles at a conference in London and was first
implemented in Azerbaijan in 2009.124 As of this writing, twenty-five countries
are compliant with the standard, thirty-five states are submitting reports,
sixteen are candidates, and over eighty industry leaders were involved.125
Unlike the KPCS, the self-implementation aspect involves adopting the
general EITI framework and adapting it to suit a state’s particular needs and
circumstances (e.g., level of development).126 This customizable facet gives
EITI the flexibility to work at many different levels of both state development
and the extraction chain of production.127 Such flexibility enables each state to
meet base standards of transparency and expand upon them for maximum
effectiveness, while not constraining them to standards they may not be able to
121 What Is the EITI?, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, http://eiti.org/eiti (last visited
March 1, 2014).
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 History of EITI, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, eiti.org/eiti/history (last visited
March 1, 2014).
125 EITI Countries, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, http://eiti.org/countries(last
visited March 1, 2014); Stakeholders, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, http://eiti.org/
supporters/companies (last visited March 1, 2014).
126 Id.
127 Cf. id.
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achieve due to a lack of resources. The benefit of this system is clear: at a
recent conference in 2011, many states brought to the table many new ways of
implementing the system that could be used by other participants.128 This sort
of innovation allows for an international framework to adapt quickly when
shortcomings are identified.
Furthermore, EITI has received the support of the UN, the G8, the G20, the
African Union, and other organizations; this broad spectrum of support on top
of the tripartite enforcement framework state, civil society, industry makes
EITI a great model for extractive industry safeguards.129 The KPCS has the
support of the UN, but EITI involves these IGOs at a higher level of
integration.130 The more than 200 reports filed by implementing states has
accounted for over $1 trillion U.S. dollars of revenue that can be traced.131
States provide financial support to the EITI framework through the World
Bank, while the International Monetary Fund helps states fund initiatives.132
This is similar to DDI’s sponsor system and makes the involved actors more
invested in the success of the framework. EITI’s system allows for lesserdeveloped states to implement the EITI standards at a much broader and
effective manner than would be feasible if they only had their own resources
for implementation.
EITI is rather new and its success in the long-term will not be known for a
while. EITI also does not have an enforcement mechanism. Rather, states
announce their intentions to implement it and are then either deemed compliant
with EITI’s standards or not by the EITI Secretariat—there are no penalties for
non-compliance.133 For all the positives EITI involves, the lack of enforcement
is a major problem. However, EITI provides a good framework as a blueprint
for future endeavors; the flexibility of implementation and involvement of
IGOs set it apart from the other frameworks developed so far.

128 History of EITI, supra note 124. For example, Ghana and Peru started tracking payments to the
subnational level of government, Liberia included forestry and agricultural industries in its monitoring, and
Nigeria’s use of additional audits. Id.
129 See EITI Factsheet, EITI, http://eiti.org/document/factsheet (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
130 See supra Part I.C–D.
131 History of EITI, supra note 124.
132 EITI Factsheet, supra note 129.
133 See id.
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G. The Legacy of the KPCS
The KPCS was a great international innovation and has been largely
successful in its mission to stymie the flow of conflict diamonds in the world.
In just one decade, the percentage of the diamond trade consisting of conflict
diamonds has been reduced to nearly nothing. However, there are fundamental
flaws in the framework that keep it from being a perfect system.
The self-policing aspect of the KPCS allows for illegal trade to occur in
countries where government institutions are weak, or worse, where the
governments either fail to take action or are actively involved in the
circumvention of KPCS protocols. Compounding this problem is the fact that
every KPCS decision requires unanimity, making it next to impossible to take
compliance action against a member that refuses to comply. Venezuela,
Zimbabwe, Côte d’Ivoire, and the DRC are examples of these flaws.
Furthermore, the KPCS does not seek to create an environment that protects
human rights or promotes development through transparency, both of which
would help clean up the industry more effectively than by only ensuring that
the mined minerals are conflict-free.
The framework would benefit from a permanent secretariat akin to that of
EITI. By coordinating the various stakeholders, implementation, and funding
of the framework, such a structure would provide stability at the heart of the
framework. This consistency is something the annually rotating chair of the
KPCS lacks. An EITI-like secretariat would create a degree of separation
between states implementing the framework and the apparatus that keeps the
framework operating efficiently.
Of course, the biggest improvement the KPCS would benefit from is
making its protocols an internationally legally binding treaty. In doing so,
violations could be brought before an international or national tribunal to
adjudicate compliance issues. This would give the framework the ability police
compliance in states like Venezuela, Zimbabwe, and Côte d’Ivoire. With the
force of law behind the obligations imposed upon states and non-state actors,
there would be real ramifications for noncompliance.
The KPCS is a framework that, while flawed, provides a great blueprint for
tackling the problems involved in extractive industries worldwide. Using the
KPCS experience as lessons learned, the rest of this Comment will focus on
the need for a similar international framework in response to China’s increased
involvement in the cobalt and copper industries in Africa.
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II. CHINA IN AFRICA
When discussing Africa’s experience with the rest of the world vis-à-vis
resource exploitation, the conversation has historically focused on the West.134
Today, the geopolitical landscape is shifting toward the East; China’s
emergence as one of the biggest economic powers has inevitably had direct
effects in resource-rich Africa. China claims that its growing relationship with
Africa is not exploitive in the vein of Western colonialism, but rather its
objective is to help spur development in Africa as China itself grows.135
However, the structure of Chinese mining firms in Africa has created a
troubled environment where human rights are infringed upon, safety standards
are minimal, and shady business deals with corrupt governments take place.136
Two of China’s most mined minerals are cobalt and copper, both of which are
used in technologies like mobile phones.137 The growing reliance on these
minerals for its expanding manufacturing economy means that unless China is
sincere in its statements of investing with Africa’s interests in mind, there will
be terrible consequences—at best, business as usual.
A. A New Type of Relationship?
China is in the midst of a decade during which it has developed a
substantial and growing relationship with Africa.138 Africa’s wealth in
resources makes it attractive for the resource-poor Asian state.139 China needs
an incredible amount of minerals for their growing electronics industry,
especially the mobile phone and computer industries.140 As worldwide demand
for these technologies continues to increase, it seems inevitable that China will
expand its mining operations in Africa. Cobalt and copper are integral to these
industries, with China importing the large majority of its cobalt from Africa
and increasing its import of African copper in recent years.141

134 Jacob Kushner, Corruption in the Congo: How China Learnt from the West, THINK AFRICA PRESS
(Oct. 3, 2013, 10:29 AM), http://thinkafricapress.com/drc/corruption-congo-how-china-learnt-west.
135 Chad Fraser, How China Is Remaking Africa’s Mining Sector, RESOURCE INVESTING NEWS (Aug. 20,
2012, 11:00 AM), http://resourceinvestingnews.com/41702-china-africa-mining-sector-investing-barrickgold.html.
136 Id.
137 See infra notes 188–97 and accompanying text.
138 See China in Africa, supra note 10.
139 See id.
140 Supra text accompanying notes 10–13.
141 Fraser, supra note 135.
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China is now the biggest investor in Africa, but in doing so has sought to
distinguish itself from the previous eras of colonialism and exploitive foreign
investment.142 China believes that, like Africa, it was a victim of Western
colonialism’s exploitive practices and thus would be a better benefactor for the
continent than the Western powers.143 This “South-South” investment focuses
on the mineral-rich areas of Africa.144 China, in return for mineral concessions,
pours money into large infrastructure projects such as roads, railways, and
telecommunications.145 The rate of this investment evinces just how fast China
is growing its presence in Africa. In 1990, Chinese foreign direct investment
(“FDI”) was around £30 million; during the last decade FDI has grown
immensely, reaching £1 billion in 2005 and approximately £53 billion by
2008.146 China characterizes their investment strategy as “non-interference,”
meaning that there are no conditions attached to the money being sent into the
receiving states.147 Attaching conditions to investment or aid money is
something Western countries have often done with their foreign investment in
Africa to ensure some of their interests are met.148
B. Conflict of Cultures
However, despite the desire to distinguish itself from the rest of the world,
China’s increased presence in Africa still creates problems. Chinese mining
companies hire Chinese nationals to run and manage their operations in Africa,
leaving only the physical mining jobs available to Africans.149 Problems
arising between the African labor force and the Chinese managers are common
in most employment situations, but the gap between what companies often get
away with in China despite the state’s labor laws and what is expected from
142

Id.
See id.; see also Tim Whewell, China to Seal $9bn DR Congo Deal, BBC NEWSNIGHT (Apr. 14, 2008,
12:07 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/7343060.stm.
144 See China in Africa, supra note 11. South-South relations are trade, technical, environmental, and
social relations between developing countries. See South-South Cooperation, KNOWLEDGE FROM THE SOUTH,
http://www.saberdelsur.org/en/definition-south-south-cooperation (last visited Oct. 24, 2013). North-South
relations are those between developed and undeveloped nations; the terms emerged from the fact that most
Northern Hemisphere states are developed while developing states tend to be in the Southern Hemisphere. Cf.
North-South Relationship, EIONET, http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/concept?ns=1&cp=11106 (last visited
Oct. 24, 2013).
145 Fraser, supra note 135.
146 Róisín Hinds, African Labour and the Chinese Dragon, RED PEPPER, http://www.redpepper.org.uk/
african-labour-and-the-chinese-dragon (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Shen & Han, supra note 9.
143
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international firms in the eyes of African workers makes these problems
difficult to resolve.150
What is acceptable in China may not be acceptable in Africa, especially in
the realm of labor issues. For example, though Chinese labor law caps weekly
hours at forty-nine, many factories on the mainland ignore it.151 Firms doing
business in Africa continue this behavior and circumvent labor laws even
further than they can in China.152 Chinese firms, having become used to lax
application of labor laws back home, have created an environment resulting in
African miners singling out Chinese firms as worse than other foreign
companies doing business in Africa Workers often raise claims that Chinese
firms pay the lowest wages out of any nationality, while at the same time the
Chinese managers claim that the African workers are “inefficient, lazy,
unskilled and disloyal.”153
This situation is exacerbated by Chinese executives in China who do not
understand the labor environment in Africa and continue to demand standards
that are more permissible in China than in Africa.154 As a result, African
workers face mistreatment at the hands of Chinese managers as well as
generally poor working conditions.155 China is not the only state with mining
operations that have been reported for abuses of human rights;156 however,
Chinese firms have been reported more than any other foreign-owned mining
operation. Moreover, their reaction to complaints is less an understanding of
the issues than it is begrudging acceptance and remedying of the situation.157
Despite the money Chinese firms pour into large infrastructure projects in
Africa, their sense of Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”) is severely
150 See NATHAN JACKSON, CHINESE LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (2011), available at http://blogs.
law.uiowa.edu/ebook/uicifd-ebook/what-are-relevant-issues-concerning-chinese-labor-and-employment-law.
151 Peter Svensson, Foxconn Apple Factories Violated Chinese Labor Laws, According to Fair Labor
Association, HUFFINGTON POST (MAR. 29, 2012, 4:54 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/29/
foxconn-apple-factories-labor-violations_n_1389392.html.
152 See Sung Un Kim, Apple Suppliers Violating China Labor Laws: Report, JURIST (Jun. 29, 2012, 2:10
PM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2012/06/apple-suppliers-violating-china-labor-laws-report.php.
153 Shen & Han, supra note 9. This sentiment is not limited to Chinese mining companies; Chinese
business owners in Ghana are unable to work with Africans due to the two peoples’ vastly contrasting views
on wage, hours, work ethic, and employer-employee relationship. See generally, Karsten Giese, Same-Same
but Different: Chinese Traders’ Perspectives on African Labor, 69 CHINA J. 134, 138, 142, 144 (2013).
154 Shen & Han, supra note 9.
155 See id.
156 See Kim, supra note 152.
157 Zambia: Workers Detail Abuse in Chinese-Owned Mines, HUMAN RTS. WATCH (Nov. 3, 2011),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/11/03/zambia-workers-detail-abuse-chinese-owned-mines.
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lacking in Africa.158 Those that do engage in CSR in China are predominantly
firms that are monitored the closest by the government; those in less
scrutinized regions do not participate in the practice at the same level.159 The
firms in Africa view themselves as beyond the reach of the Chinese state where
they would be most likely to try to help society. Therefore, they do not practice
CSR in Africa beyond the capital invested in infrastructure projects as part of
their entry into a state.
Mines that are owned by other states have their share of problems and
incidents, but it is the combination of poor compliance back home and the
shortcomings of the Chinese South-South investment strategy that make
China’s endeavors in Africa the focus of this Comment. When analyzed in
comparison to Australia’s increasing involvement in Africa’s mineral industry
and its method of investment, the problems associated with China’s growing
relationship with Africa are that much more troubling.
C. Differing Mining Explosions: Australia and China
To further illustrate why China is of particular concern, it is helpful to
discuss Australia’s mining activities in Africa. The growing industry and
burgeoning expansion into Africa provide a close parallel to China’s recent
development. Australia’s situation shines additional light as to why exactly
China’s increased presence in Africa is particularly cause for concern.
1. Australia’s Brand of Investment
Australia is projected to invest approximately $50 billion over the next
three years in its mining operations in Africa.160 Australian companies have
more operations in Africa than any other region in the world, with over 200
Australian Stock Exchange-listed companies involved in over 700 projects.161
Not content to merely reap the mineral riches, Australia has invested in many
158 Corporate social responsibility includes health and safety of the community, improving disclosure to
the public, creating equal treatment environments, and building a strong relationship with stakeholders. Wing
S. Chow & Yang Chen, Corporate Sustainable Development: Testing a New Scale Based on the Mainland
Chinese Context, 105 J. BUS. ETHICS 519, 521 (2012); see Fraser, supra note 135.
159 See id. at 523.
160 Olive Newell, Why Australian Mining Companies Are Eyeing Africa, AFR. REP. (Feb. 4, 2013, 2:46
PM),
http://www.theafricareport.com/News-Analysis/why-australian-mining-companies-are-eyeing-africa.
html. Seeing the success and resources of Chinese firms in Africa, Australian companies seek Chinese
investment and the two countries have worked together on mining projects throughout the world. Id.
161 Africa Down Under, AUSAID, http://www.ausaid.gov.au/MediaReleases/Pages/Display.aspx?QID=
1754.
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programs that help spur development, such as the Mining for Development
Initiative and sponsoring the creation of the African Minerals Development
Centre.162
Programs such as AusAID bring African officials to Australia on study
tours of the mining sector, while Australia’s donations to EITI and its
partnership with the International Monetary Fund assist African states in
developing tax policy, liability management, and economic regulation serve
the African community directly.163 Australia has announced that it is joining
the African Development Bank and is extending 1,000 scholarships to African
students to study in Australia.164 Compared with China’s infrastructure-based
investment, Australia injects cash into African states in ways that are more
beneficial in the long run: Education, expertise, troubleshooting, and
investment outside of the mining industry all show that Australia is investing
in a sincere manner towards Africa’s future development.
2. Mining Down Under
Australia’s home mining sector has boomed in recent years, as employment
has jumped from 28,500 workers in 2001 to 101,100 in 2011, almost a
quadruple increase in one decade.165 Western Australia, the most active mining
state in Australia, generated $5 billion in 2010 alone, compared to $22 billion
from 1984 to 2009.166 Southern Australia, meanwhile, amended its Mining Act
in 2011 to include a provision requiring leaseholders to file compliance reports
with the Minister for Mineral Resource Development after each period set by
the Minister.167

162 Id. The Mining for Development sponsors 150 African individuals to study the mining practices,
regulations, and implementation in Australia. Id.; Mining Development Initiative, AUSAID, http://www.ausaid.
gov.au/aidissues/mining/Pages/mining-for-development-initiative.aspx.
163 See Africa Down Under, supra note 161.
164 See id. Australia has provided assistance to South Sudan in formulating its resource laws, provided
Liberia with technical advisors, and created projects that account for a sizeable chunk of some African states’
GDP. Id.
165 Sarah Moolman, New Regulations Will Impact Australia’s Mining Boom-KPMG, MINING WKLY.
(Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.miningweekly.com/article/new-regulations-will-impact-australias-mining-boomkpmg-2012-08-10.
166 AUDITOR GENERAL, ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH CONDITIONS ON MINING 4, 18 (Sept. 2011) (Austl.).
167 Mining Act 2001 (SA) (Austl.).
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Western Australia included a comprehensive mental health assessment of
workers in the mining industry in its investigation of incidents.168 In another
report, Western Australia noted that many of the compliance and enforcement
apparatuses were working inadequately and in response to the findings,
overhauled its system.169 Of course, no amount of precaution can make the
extractive industry completely incident-proof, but preventative measures,
especially enforced regulations, can mitigate the dangerous nature of the
industry.
In June of 2012, there were 168 serious injuries and high-risk situations in
Australian mines.170 In 2010, only three workers died, a decrease from seven
the year before.171 However, there were sixty-five more disabling injuries than
the previous year.172 Only twenty fatalities occurred from 2005–2010.173 In
2011 and 2012, Western Australia successfully resolved all complaints of
inadequate health and safety conditions in its mines and completed all
investigations resulting from incidents.174 As the mining industry expands in
Australia, officials have been responsive and successful in making practices as
safe and worker-oriented as possible. Such are the problems inherent in a
rapidly expanding industry, but the conditions in Australia are considerably
better than those in China.
3. Mining on the Mainland
Mining in China is governed by The Mineral Resources Law of the
People’s Republic of China, which sets down standards for concessions, safety
and inspection, taxation, and environmental concerns.175 On its face, the law is
fairly comprehensive. Currently, the State Council owns all mineral resources
on behalf of the Chinese government—who in turn owns all mineral resources
168

DEP’T OF MINES & PETROLEUM, RESOURCES SAFETY ACHIEVEMENTS AND PERFORMANCE 2011–12, at
7 (2012).
169 See generally, ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH CONDITIONS ON MINING supra note 166, at 8, 10.
170 Susie Nordqvist, Safety Concerns in Booming Australian Mining Industry, 3 NEWS (Aug. 19, 2012,
6:15
PM),
http://www.3news.co.nz/Safety-concerns-in-booming-Australian-mining-industry/tabid/421/
articleID/265970/Default.aspx.
171 DEP’T OF MINES & PETROLEUM, SAFETY PERFORMANCE IN THE WESTERN AUSTRALIAN EXTRACTION
INDUSTRY: ACCIDENT AND INJURY STATISTICS 2009–2010, at 7 (2011).
172 Id. at 2. Injuries requiring more than two weeks off or a change of job responsibility are considered
disabling injuries.
173 Id. at 7.
174 DEP’T OF MINES & PETROLEUM, supra note 168, at 3.
175 William L. MacBride, Jr. & Wang Bei, Chinese Mining Law Overview–Part 1 of 4, INFOMINE (Jun.
15, 2001), http://www.infomine.com/suppliers/supplymine-news/June15-2001.html.
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in China under the Chinese Constitution—and is the sole entity that empowers
the various agencies to implement administrative regulations in the mining
industry.176 Though there is great state control over the mining industry,
provinces may adopt local mining regulations not under the purview of the
Ministry of Land and Resources.177 With a state the size of China, it is logical
to allow for flexibility of implementation.
China’s mining laws are comprehensive, including safety procedures,
noncompliance reporting, equipment training, and compliance investigation.178
Depending on the degree of noncompliance, fines are levied upon investigation
and in instances of extreme violation of the mining laws, criminal charges may
be brought against the violating entity.179 Trade unions are permissible and
often bring complaints of safety violations.180 However, weak rule of law,
unfair competition facilitated by the state, and rent-seeking by companies all
make it difficult for these mining laws to be effective.181 Insufficient health and

176 Id. State-owned companies were at one time the only entities involved in mineral mining, but recently
the expansion of the economy has brought in privately and collectively owned enterprises from Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and other foreign investment sources. Id. What this means for the future is yet to be determined on an
industry-wide scale.
177 William L. MacBride, Jr. & Wang Bei, Chinese Mining Law Overview–Part 2 of 4, INFOMINE (Jun.
25, 2001), http://www.infomine.com/suppliers/supplymine-news/June25-2001.html. Provinces govern
exploration of medium-scale mineral reserves and prefectures and counties control exploration of small-scale
mineral reserves. Id.
178 See, e.g., Law on Work Safety (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Jun. 29,
2002, effective Nov. 1, 2002), available at http://www.chinamining.org/Policies/2006-08-07/
1154931087d471.html; Law on Safety in Mines (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Nov. 7, 1992, effective May 1, 1993), available at http://www.chinamining.org/Policies/2006-08-07/
1154932041d472.html; Regulations for the Implementation of the Law on Safety in Mines (promulgated by
the State Council, Oct. 30, 1996, effective Oct. 30, 1996), available at http://www.chinamining.org/Policies/
2006-08-07/1154929995d467.html.
179 See Law on Work Safety (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Jun. 29, 2002,
effective Nov. 1, 2002), available at http://www.chinamining.org/Policies/2006-08-07/1154931087d471.html;
Law on Safety in Mines (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 7, 1992, effective
May 1, 1993), available at http://www.chinamining.org/Policies/2006-08-07/1154932041d472.html;
Regulations for the Implementation of the Law on Safety in Mines (promulgated by the State Council, Oct. 30,
1996, effective Oct. 30, 1996), available at http://www.chinamining.org/Policies/2006-08-07/
1154929995d467.html.
180 See Law on Safety in Mines (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 7, 1992,
effective May 1, 1993), available at http://www.chinamining.org/Policies/2006-08-07/1154932041d472.html;
Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safety in Mines
(promulgated by the State Council, Oct. 30, 1996, effective Oct. 30, 1996), available at http://www.
chinamining.org/Policies/2006-08-07/1154929995d467.html.
181 Genia Kostka, Mobility and Agency: Private Sector Development in Rural Central China, 67 CHINA J.
47, 48 (2012).
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safety conditions in the mines are a direct result of this environment and
directly cause the high fatality numbers in Chinese mines.182
The numerous large-scale accidents at mines in China shows no sign of
abatement. Compared with South Africa, another Newly Industrialized
Country,183 China’s fatality figures from the past few years were similar, but
South Africa has implemented successful measures to decrease deaths while
China’s figures have not seen a similar drop—therefore it is not a question of
level of development.184 China’s fatality numbers are well above those of the
other major mining States; a recent mine incident in August 2012 claimed
more than forty lives, sending the total deaths in 2012 through August up to
832.185 In 2011, there were 1970 fatalities in Chinese mines, down from 3786
in 2007 and close to 7000 in 2002. There is some improvement but these
numbers are only fatalities and do not include the total number of serious and
disabling injuries.186 More alarming is that many of these large disasters occur
in illegal private mines, showing that while there are laws in place, they are
highly ineffective in regulating the extraction industry.187 China has made great
strides in reducing extraction-related deaths, but the underlying dysfunction of
its regulatory system poses considerable hurdles to overcome.
China’s mining environment is markedly different from Australia’s and it
consequently affects the way firms of either state do business in Africa.
182

See Mark Gregory, Why Are China’s Mines so Dangerous?, BBC NEWS (Oct. 7, 2010, 2:14 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-11497070.
183 A Newly Industrialized Country is one that is less-than-developed, but is becoming rapidly
industrialized. Explanatory Notes—Asian Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs), INDUS. CAN. (last modified
June 14, 2012), http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/tdo-dcd.nsf/eng/00042.html.
184 Mining Safety in South Africa, MINING SAFETY, http://www.miningsafety.co.za/dynamiccontent/61/
Mining-Safety-in-South-Africa (last visited Oct. 24, 2013). From 2003 to 2010, mining-related fatalities have
decreased from 270 to 128. Id. South Africa has been struggling with increased strikes over working
conditions, many of which have gotten violent. Tula Dlamini, Mine Revolt: It’s the Working Conditions,
SABC NEWS (Sept. 13, 2012, 2:35 PM), http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/dc79de804cb45813848ac4b0603469
04/Mine-revolt:-It’s-the-working-conditions—20120913; see also Shona Kohler, Death in the Name of Profit:
South Africa’s Mine Safety Scourge, CONSULTANCY AFRICA (Aug. 2, 2010, 8:01 AM), http://www.
consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=500:death-in-the-name-of-profitsouth-africas-mine-safety-scourge&catid=82:african-industry-a-business&Itemid=266.
185 Elizabeth Yuan, Death Toll Rises to 41 in China Mine Blast, CNN NEWS (Aug. 31, 2012, 3:34 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/30/world/asia/china-miners-blast; Chen Xin & Zhi Yun, China’s Coal Mines
Still Risky, CHINA DAILY (Aug. 25, 2012, 12:57 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-08/25/
content_15705033.htm.
186 Yuan, supra note 188; James T. Areddy, China Coal Sector Has Safety Setback, WALL ST. J., (Sept. 4,
2012), at A13.
187 Mike Head, A Wave of Mine Disasters, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE (May 31, 2010), http://www.
wsws.org/en/articles/2010/05/pers-m31.html.
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Furthermore, Australia’s investment in Africa is spread through society at
many levels and is directed towards setting a state on solid footing for
development, while China’s is focused on statewide infrastructure projects
that, while beneficial in some aspects, do not tend to improve the situation of
human rights nor of individual communities within the extractive industry.
Australia’s focus remains on the local level of improvement within the industry
and China’s investment is often not focused on the industry at all.
D. Technology-Driven Mineral Investment
China’s technology industry, which relies on cobalt and copper, has driven
its increased resource demand. Both minerals represent some of the biggest
investments by China in Africa: China imports sixty percent of Africa’s entire
cobalt deposits and twenty-five to thirty percent of the continent’s copper,
according to 2009 figures.188 By 2012, oil, cotton, cobalt, and copper made up
seventy percent of China’s total imports from Africa.189 China mines these two
minerals from many states in Africa, but there are two that play a more
pronounced role: the DRC and Zambia.
1. DRC: Cobalt and Copper Controversies
African mines account for about eighty-five percent of China’s total cobalt
imports, though the continent contains only fifty-three percent of the world’s
deposits.190 Cobalt is mined mainly from the DRC, a country whose history is
marked by human rights abuses and exploitation—not limited to the extractive
sector. In 2007, China signed an unprecedented agreement with the DRC that
opened up 400,000 tons of cobalt and ten million tons of copper in exchange
for Chinese investment in roads, schools, railways, and hospitals.191 The DRC
is often in the middle of discussions regarding exploitation and human rights
abuses in the extractive industries, especially their diamond mines, where

188 Chris Alden & Ana Cristina Alves, China and Africa’s Natural Resources: The Challenges and
Implications for Development and Governance, 41 S. AFR. INST. INT’L AFFAIRS 15 (2009), available at
http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/China_and_Africa_s_Natural_Resources.pdf (citing VIVIAN FOSTER ET
AL., THE WORLD BANK, BUILDING BRIDGES CHINA’S GROWING ROLE AS INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCIER FOR
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 38–39 (2009)).
189 Arezki Daoud, Competing for Africa: Is China’s Africa’s Economic Campaign Unstoppable?, N. AFR.
J. (Sept. 27, 2012, 12:15 PM), http://www.north-africa.com/naj_economy/economy_trade/1septtwenty
seven47.html.
190 Anthony Halley, Japan Chasing China with $32 Billion African Resource Push, MINING.COM (June
23, 2013), http://www.mining.com/japan-chasing-china-with-32-billion-african-resource-push-48124/.
191 Whewell, supra note 143.

BURTON GALLEYSPROOFS3

2014]

8/6/2014 9:15 AM

REVERSE THE CURSE

453

warring factions compete for control.192 The cobalt mines are no exception to
these abuses.
There have been reports of acid dumps into rivers, use of child labor, and
deadly working conditions in the Katanga cobalt and copper mines.193 China
has significant relations with the DRC due to the fact that the African country
contains about ten percent of the world’s copper deposits, as well as large
cobalt deposits.194 The 2007 deal is expected to produce over 400,000 tons of
copper for China per year through 2013.195 Chinese abuses have occurred
throughout their extractive relationships with African countries, especially due
to China’s ever-increasing presence.196 Africa contains the world’s largest
reserve of cobalt, practically ensuring China’s permanent presence on the
continent and specifically within the DRC.197
2. Zambia: Striking Copper
Copper is mined largely in Angola and Zambia, the latter of which has been
the site of many reports of human rights abuses, poor working conditions, and
violence.198 Zambia is also notable because it is on the receiving end of a great
amount of Chinese FDI, having just completed a $832 million deal with a
Chinese firm called China Ferrous Mining Corporation to mine copper.199
192 See U.N. Expert Group Meeting on Natural Resources and Conflicts in Africa: Transforming a Peace
Liability into a Peace Asset, Cairo, Egypt, June 17–19, 2006, http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/reports/Natural%
20Resources%20and%20Conflict%20in%20Africa_%20Cairo%20Conference%20ReportwAnnexes%20Nov
%2017.pdf.
193 Frik Els, Billionaire Behaving Badly? Glencore’s Glasenberg Caught in Africa Child Labour, Acid
Dumping Row, MINING.COM (Apr. 14, 2012), http://www.mining.com/billionaire-behaving-badly-glencoresglasenberg-caught-in-africa-child-labour-acid-dumping-row/.
194 Nickel and Cobalt Mining in Democratic Republic of The Congo-Copper and Cobalt Mining, MBENDI,
http://www.mbendi.com/indy/ming/nkcb/af/zr/p0005.htm (last updated Oct. 24, 2013).
195 Democratic Republic of Congo’s Mining Industry Accepts US $9Bn in Investments from China in
First Half of 2009, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 7, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&
sid=awKjdVsQybWQ.
196 Mark Mobius, China’s Growing Presence in Africa, REUTERS (May 24, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.
com/trnewsmaker/2011/05/24/chinas-growing-presence-in-africa/.
197 See U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Afr., Africa Review Report on Mining: Executive Summary 2,
http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/aficanreviewreport-on-miningsummary.pdf (last visited
Mar. 3, 2014).
198 Zambia: Workers Detail Abuse in Chinese-Owned Mines, supra note 160; (citing HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, YOU’LL BE FIRED IF YOU REFUSE: LABOR ABUSES IN CHINESE STATE-OWNED COPPER MINES 32–73
(2011))
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/zambia1111ForWebUpload.pdf
(documenting numerous abuses by Chinese mine operators in Zambia).
199 Zambia Approves $832 mln Chinese Copper Project, REUTERS (Sept. 20, 2012, 10:31 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/20/zambia-mining-idUSL5E8KKHQO20120920.
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Zambians see the intrusion as mostly negative, not only do Chinese business
owners hire mainly Chinese workers, but the businesses are undercutting local
ones and driving them out.200
China’s recent and substantial investment in Zambia is due to the country’s
large deposits of copper. From 2000 to 2010, China’s FDI in Zambia grew
from £60 million to over £560 million per year.201 China’s demands for copper
have gone up, and Zambia is Africa’s largest producer of the mineral.202
Currently, China is second only to the United States in copper consumption.203
Recently, workers rioted and killed a Chinese manager and injured another at
the Collum coal mine in the course of demanding that the Chinese firm in
charge implement the newly established minimum wage.204 This occurred only
one year after two Chinese managers were acquitted of shooting at striking
workers.205 The Collum incident illustrates the problems arising in areas where
Chinese firms are establishing extractive operations.206 As Chinese investment
grows in the copper industry, the frequency of these incidents will only
increase at copper mines.
Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) reported that the Chinese mining
companies ultimately paid the striking workers the minimum wage but
nevertheless still pay the lowest wages among foreign-owned mining
businesses across different mineral industries.207 HRW also found that Chinese
firms maintain low safety standards in Africa and that the underreporting of
accidents and bribery of safety officers by Chinese firms are commonplace.208
200 Palash R. Ghosh, Zambia Seizes Chinese-Owned Mine Over Poor Safety Record: The Fraying
Relations Between Beijing and Africa, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.ibtimes.com/zambiaseizes-chinese-owned-mine-over-poor-safety-record-fraying-relations-between-beijing-africa. The former
agriculture minister recently stated that while foreign investment and immigration is nothing new, “the
Chinese are the worst of all.” Id.
201 Hinds, supra note 146.
202 Id.
203 William L. MacBride, Jr. & Wang Bei, Chinese Mining Law Overview—Part 4 of 4, INFOMINE (Aug.
6, 2001), http://www.infomine.com/suppliers/supplymine-news/Aug06-2001.html.
204 See Zhang Boling & He Xin, The Killing of a Miner in Zambia, CAIXIN ONLINE (Aug. 20, 2012 6:56
PM), http://english.caixin.com/2012-08-20/100426275.html.
205 U.S. Dep’t. of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & Labor, 2011 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT:
Zambia (Oct. 17, 2013), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186467.pdf.
206 The situation at Collum deteriorated and the Zambian government seized the mine from the Chinese
company over safety concerns in February of 2013. Ghosh, supra note 200. The government cited failure to
pay mining royalties by the company, poor health and safety conditions, hard labor, shifts of twelve and
eighteen hours, and the preclusion of unions. Id.
207 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, YOU’LL BE FIRED IF YOU REFUSE 3 (2011), available at http://www.hrw.
org/node/102594/section/3.
208 Id. passim.
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Chinese mines also regularly assign twelve-hour and eighteen-hour shifts to
their workers, despite other states maintaining a standard of eight-hour
shifts.209 Some workers reported that a few Chinese copper firms do not give
even a single day off during the entire year.210
E. Sincerely Changing Standards?
In response to the HRW report, the Chinese government claimed that the
subcontractors were at fault in some cases reported and that the government is
aware of the workers’ complaints.211 As for rectifying the problems, the
Chinese government seems to limit its response to doing only what it needs to
do to quiet complaints.212 What is troubling about the rest of the Chinese
response is their contentment to pass off many of the allegations as the result
of two very different cultures and not as substantive problems.213 This is
alarming because it signals that Chinese officials do not recognize wrongdoing
per se. Rather, they attribute it to African workers not being used to the
Chinese conception of labor rights and employment relationships. According
to this view, there are no problems to be alleviated beyond satisfying
international watchdog norms.214
The tragic 2005 explosion at the Chambishi copper mine evinces the
potential disasters that can result from this practice.215 The explosion claimed
forty-seven lives and was ultimately attributed to insufficient safety standards
at the mine.216 Recently, a Chinese company announced a new mining venture
at the Kilembe copper deposits in western Uganda worth $100 million.217
China’s need for copper will only grow in the coming years as its economy and
manufacturing sector continue to grow, meaning that more mines will open up
under the management of Chinese corporations, further diluting the oversight
of the Chinese government back home even further than it already is.
209

Id. at 51, 52, 65.
Id.
211 See generally David Smith, Chinese Mining Firms in Zambia Under Fire for Mistreating Workers,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 3, 2011, 6:01 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2011/nov/03/chinesemining-zambia-mistreating-workers.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 See id.
215 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 207, at 3.
216 Id. at 7.
217 Chinese Company To Invest US $100 Million in Kilembe Mines, STATE HOUSE UGANDA (April 27,
2013), http://www.statehouse.go.ug/media/news/2012/04/27/chinese-company-invest-us100-million-kilembemines.
210
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Beyond China’s involvement in cobalt and copper, Chinese entities own
fifty percent of the largest mining company in Zimbabwe.218 Despite the
KPCS’s approval of exports from that country, there are still many reports of
whippings, rapes, and waterboarding-type activities from the mines owned by
that company.219 Zimbabwe’s problems in the diamond industry were
discussed above and China’s involvement with the worst violators is troubling
for the future. China shows no sign of slowing its rate of investment in Africa
and may soon be involved in a much more extensive way on the continent; it is
of the utmost importance to establish an international framework that can
successfully curb human rights abuses, prohibit the sale of conflict-supporting
minerals, and ensure transparency and equity in revenue distribution. A new
framework is needed and with China as a focal point due to its presence in
Africa, the framework should initially focus on two of the fastest growing
resource needs of China and biggest reserves in Africa—cobalt and copper.
III. CREATING A FRAMEWORK
The Resource Curse is no small obstacle to overcome. One of the reasons
why mining does not lead to development is the lack of linkages with the
extraction-related industries and local, regional, and national governments.220
The lack of these linkages is why the Chinese method of pouring money into
large infrastructure projects is not as beneficial as Australia’s investment
strategy of education and expertise, especially when the former is often
directed by an underlying self-interest (e.g.: better roads help with
transportation of minerals). Though many African countries have revised their
mining codes, harmonized their regulations internally, and increased
involvement in and benefits to the mining communities, foreign companies still
hold the majority of power in decision-making.221
As discussed in Part I, the KPCS is an important endeavor to stop abuses in
the extractive industry. However, it is limited to one mineral, focuses only on
conflict areas, and generally has little authority to bind members legally and
demand compliance. There is no doubt that the KPCS succeeded in its mission
to halt the conflict diamond trade in its first couple of years in existence.
218

Jason Moyo, Murky World of Marange Mining Firms, MAIL & GUARDIAN (July 6, 2012, 7:13 AM),
http://mg.co.za/article/2012-07-05-murky-world-of-marange-mining-firms/.
219 Marange Diamonds: Zimbabwe Denies “Torture Camp,” BBC NEWS (Aug. 9, 2011, 1:47 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14468116.
220 U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Afr., supra note 197.
221 Id. at 7−10.
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Unfortunately, the institutional shortcomings prevent it from keeping everyone
in check over time. The solution lies in creating a framework with two
characteristics. First, the framework should be a hybrid that combines the
successful aspects of the KPCS and other similar frameworks with an
enforcement mechanism recognized by international law. Second, the
framework must be able to be applied to more than one mineral. By creating an
adaptable framework, other industries can graft it on to their existing
regulatory structure to effectively ameliorate their specific ills.
The KPCS’s tripartite collaboration between governments, civil society
organizations, and leaders of industry works well. The authority of state
governments, bolstered by the localized efforts of civil organizations, gives the
Framework the ability to put legitimate pressure on non-compliers and
provides a large information base to analyze the industry under regulation. By
adding the expert knowledge and power of industry leaders, this three-pronged
structure ensures informed decision-making and a multitude of different
resources at the Framework’s command.
Years of experience of both industry insiders and human rights lawyers will
enable governments, civil society organizations, and the workers themselves to
work with a better understanding of what can be achieved in regulation, the
more technical aspects of the cobalt and copper industries, and how to tackle
the ethical implications of extractive practices. By deepening the Framework’s
involvement in all stages of the process, it will better respond to problems that
develop.
A. Industry Leaders
There are two industry organizations that may be able to act in a similar
role to the World Diamond Initiative within the KPCS for the Framework, the
Cobalt Development Institute and the International Copper Association. Each
has certain strengths that would help create an effective Framework. The
Cobalt Development Institute (“CDI”) is a non-profit organization made up of
producers, users, recyclers, and traders of cobalt, including forty-four members
from eighteen countries.222 CDI is primed for this role because it already works
with state goverments, others in the cobalt industry, and civil society.223 Its
partnerships enable it to promote good environmental and human safety

222
223

The Institute, COBALT DEV. INST., http://www.thecdi.com/institute (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
Id.
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practices among its members.224 The organization advises governments and
industry actors to foster cooperation and scientific data sharing.225 Having been
in existence in its current form since 1982 and actively seeking the goals the
Framework should achieve, CDI is suited for acting as a lead industry
representative for the cobalt industry.226
The International Copper Association, Ltd. (“ICA”) was established in
1989 and was formed by twenty-four industry-leading producers to coordinate
efforts of copper productions worldwide.227 As the biggest coalition of copper
industry members currently operating, ICA would play a vital role.228 Along
with promoting use of the mineral, ICA also seeks to protect the environment
and safety of those involved in the mining and manufacturing process.229 ICA
has forty-three members and focuses its efforts in more than sixty countries.230
The organization partners with over 500 NGOs throughout the world to
achieve its objectives, an important facet for the Framework’s purposes.231
While ICA is concerned with increasing copper production, it aims to do so in
a way for the industry to become more sustainable, healthier for its workers,
and more environmentally friendly.232 It has a solid foundation to begin
working as an industry partner within the Framework.
However, ICA is not in as good a position as CDI to take on the role of an
industry representative in the Framework because it is governed by a board of
directors made up of only industry members with no civil society or state
representation.233 Having the decision-making apparatus controlled only by
industry brings up the self-policing problem seen in the KPCS—albeit on the
industry side.234 However, this problem should be mitigated by the

224

Id.
Id.
226 Id.
227 History of Organization, COPPER ALLIANCE, http://copperalliance.org/about-us/history-of-organization
(last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
228 ICA Members, COPPER ALLIANCE, http://copperalliance.org/members (last visited Oct. 24, 2013). ICA
currently works with over 500 organizations worldwide. Id.
229 Id.
230 About Us, COPPER ALLIANCE, http://copperalliance.org/about-us (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
231 Id.
232 Our Value Proposition, COPPER ALLIANCE, http://copperalliance.org/about-us/our-value-proposition
(last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
233 Governance, INT’L COPPER ASS’N, http://copperalliance.org/about-us/governance (last visited Oct. 24,
2013).
234 ICA does have an offshoot organization that works regionally in Africa, but it is mainly concerned
with making market inroads rather than improving the lives of the workers and communities around copper
225
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involvement of CDI and other institutional structures of the Framework
developed below.
ICA is the biggest coalition of copper industry members currently
operating and does work with over 500 organizations worldwide.235 In joining
the Framework as an industry leader, ICA would need to increase its
collaboration with both civil society and state entities and focus increasingly
on human rights issues over promoting the use of copper in products. Both
CDI and ICA could help in monitoring and reaching out to the cobalt and
copper industries in Africa and the markets of the resulting manufactured
products. Of course, even with industry efforts, the Framework would not be
effective if there was no way of ensuring compliance.
B. An Enforceable Framework
The Framework requires the ability to hold violators accountable under the
law. The KPCS lacks binding power over its members and there is no
applicability of international law within the KPCS framework, allowing
countries like Zimbabwe and Venezuela to continue to export their diamonds
regardless of their status in the KPCS. It would be wise to include IGOs to the
mix to bolster the binding nature of the new organization—the experience of
negotiating the various interests of states is vital for any international
institution to function, especially when it comes to economic concerns.
While the United Nations does express its support of the KPCS, it has little
involvement in the framework otherwise.236 Creating a framework that is not
just working in collaboration with the UN—like EITI does—but is also legally
backed by the UN will ensure greater accountability by the use of UN
Monitors or harsh sanctions. If a state is faced with penalties that extend past
the regulated industry, there is more of an impetus to reign-in corruption and
non-compliance.237 Perhaps if Venezuela or Zimbabwe were faced with
economy-wide sanctions they would be more willing to rein-in the smuggling

mines. See Introduction, COPPER DEV. ASS’N AFR., http://www.copper.co.za/about-cdaa/introduction/ (last
visited Oct. 24, 2013).
235 See supra notes 230–31.
236 The Kimberley Process, GLOBAL WITNESS, http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/conflict/conflictdiamonds/kimberley-process (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
237 However, if sanctions are proposed they need to be worth more to the countries imposing it than if
they chose another path of punishment. If the sanctions’ worth is outweighed, there is no incentive to levy
them on a noncomplying entity. See Eric Neumayer, Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect
for Human Rights?, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 925, 927 (2005).
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of and abuses surrounding its diamonds. Success in South Africa and Libya
makes this an attractive way to bolster enforcement.238 The drawback to UN
sanctions is that they are only used against state actors and thus corporations
would not be under direct scrutiny; instead, it would be up to states through
their own sanctions or increased tariffs and industry leaders to take action
against non-complying corporations. However, sanctions with the force of
IGOs behind it would be more effective.
C. Regional Legitimacy
The UN has its share of critics, but having its involvement furthers the
legitimacy of an international body. More importantly, involving regional
IGOs, especially in Africa, furthers the ability to enforce. The African Union
and especially the Southern African Development Community (“SADC”) can
provide information, enforcement assets, and legitimacy to the Framework.
Additionally, SADC encompasses the cobalt and copper states in Africa.239
Due to the structure of these IGOs, they would enable state members of the
Framework to come together and tailor the standards of the Framework to that
particular region—southern Africa for the initial purposes of the
Framework.240
SADC already has institutions that would benefit this task, including
tribunals to adjudicate disputes and deal with non-compliance and a secretariat
with the means to effectively monitor mining sites.241 The regional
organization has also succeeded in harmonizing state regulations and creating a
tentative framework that contains guidelines for mineral rights, tax issues, and
environmental engagement.242 Regional involvement is key since it is often at
the local level where resources are lacking to deal with the negative
consequences of the extractive industry; organizations like SADC and the

238 Experts: Sanctions Partially Successful as Diplomatic Tool, VOICE OF AMERICA (Oct. 27, 2009, 11:20
AM), http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13-2008-03-10-voa20-66635467/556927.html.
239 Member State, S. AFR. DEV. COMMUNITY, http://www.sadc.int/member-states (last visited Oct. 24,
2013).
240 Southern African Development Community (SADC), AFR. UNION, http://www.africa-union.org/root/
au/recs/sadc.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
241 Id.; see also Vision, Mission & Mandate, S. AFR. DEV. COMMUNITY, http://www.sadc.int/sadcsecretariat/vision-mandate (last visited Oct. 24, 2013). Though the tribunal that adjudicates disputes between
member states is suspended at the moment, SADC has resolved to create a new one. SADC Tribunal, S. AFR.
DEV. COMMUNITY, http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/sadc-institutions/tribun (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
242 U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Afr., supra note 197, at 8.
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African Union can sponsor initiatives on behalf of the resource-low local
municipalities.243
D. Empowered Through International Standards
The KPCS was not a true international organization nor was it a legal
agreement amongst its members. The new framework would be best served if
it had the force of an international agreement, such as the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Seas244 or the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (“UDHR”).245 The latter is not itself binding but has led to the creation
of binding international human rights agreements.246 While non-compliance
within the KPCS results in a ban and thus the inability to trade diamonds with
members, those non-complying countries may still trade with countries outside
of the KPCS. There is no other recourse for the KPCS to take. As seen in the
case of Venezuela, being outside of the KPCS may end up being more
beneficial for the state than remaining an active participant.
The UDHR is on point for the Framework and it is a good source to mine
standards from.247 Article 23(1) states that all peoples have the right to work
and to “just and favorable conditions of work,” while other subsections give
people a right to equal pay for equal work and the right to form unions.248
Article 23 ensures that the wage discrepancies in Chinese firms will be
remedied and that African workers will be able to join organizations that will
represent their interests when disputes arise. The following article stipulates
that periodic holidays and limitation of hours are granted as a right to all
workers, meaning Chinese mining companies will no longer be able to work
their employees to exhaustion with no respite.249 Article 5 prohibits torture and
cruel, degrading, or inhuman treatment; this speaks to the reported beatings

243

Id. at 14.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
245 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10,
1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
246 Human Rights, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/human_rights (last visited Oct. 24,
2013).
247 The UDHR is just one of the human rights documents that form what is known as the International Bill
of Human Rights. For the purposes of the Framework, the broader provisions of the UDHR will not be needed;
however, there are provisions that may serve as models for the Framework. It must be noted that the UDHR is
not a legally binding treaty but rather an internationally-recognized document that directly informs states’
human rights behavior.
248 UDHR, supra note 245, art. 23.
249 Id. art. 24.
244
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and whippings African works claim have been brought upon them in various
mines.250
There are shortcomings of the UDHR and other such documents (e.g.,
European Convention on Human Rights), but the smaller scope of rights
protection and other aspects of the Framework should alleviate state worries
about sovereignty and the ability to expend resources in the protection of
human rights.251 While the UDHR serves as an overarching human rights
regime foundation, the provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) are better suited for the Framework
due to the actual international obligations they bestow upon ratifying states.
ICCPR contains provisions against inhuman treatment, forced labor, and
banning trade unions.252 ICESCR, due to its subject matter, is more germane to
the Framework. Article 2 lays out a general requirement for ratifying states to
ensure protection of human rights through their national legislature, with focus
on developing states.253 The main provision for the Framework outlines the
right to favorable and just conditions of work, including healthy and safe
working conditions (encompassing environmental degradation) and reasonable
limitation of hours.254 On a broader level, ICESCR includes the right to an
adequate standard of living—a tough right to enforce, but one that lays a
foundation for better wages and a fairer distribution of resource revenue.255
Having been ratified by many states across varying cultures, the language and
framing of these treaty provisions serve as a great model for implementing an
international framework involved in a specialized industry of which many
states take part that would be approved of by those states.
These provisions found in the UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR lay out the
human rights issues of employment and serve as blueprint for an adequate
Framework for targeting abuses in extractive industries. The Framework must
build on this and establish more specific protections related to the extractive

250

Id. art. 5.
Cenap Çakmak, Shortcomings in the ECHR and Other Council of Europe Legal Documents on Human
Rights, 2 REV. INT’L L. & POL. 117, 123, 127 (2006).
252 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 7, 8, 22, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
253 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 UNTS 3
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1976).
254 Id. art. 7.
255 Id. art. 11.
251
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process and general nature of abuses by Chinese and other extra-national
corporations as well as states themselves.
E. Home Remedies
Two legally binding international human rights treaties—ICCPR and
ICESCR—laid the foundation for human rights of workers. Due to their force
of law for ratifying states, they have provisions detailing enforcement
procedures and institutions that monitor the Covenants and ensure
compliance.256 This aspect of the Framework is one that will determine its
success down the road.
The ICCPR establishes a Human Rights Committee (“Committee”) of state
members that are elected and serve a limited term.257 The Committee takes on
disputes that arise between ratifying states and cases brought before it claiming
noncompliance; interestingly enough, the Committee will only take cases after
all domestic remedies have been exhausted.258 This would be greatly needed in
the Framework as it prevents members—whether governmental, civil society,
or industry—from believing that they immediately are forced to take disputes
before the Framework’s judiciary organ. It allows the states to remedy abuses
on their own terms or engage in non-adjudicatory means of dispute resolution.
Flexibility is key to the wide application of the Framework—dispute resolution
must be multi-faceted and allow for multiple avenues towards compliance.
Allowing for domestic remedies as the first step of resolving compliance
issues may prompt quicker dispute resolution and a willingness to have parties
negotiate on their own. Using this sort of procedure grants the parties in
question the power to mutually decide who sits in judges’ chairs during the
proceeding, which creates an environment more favorable to dispute
resolution;259 the process places more control in the hands of the parties,
important especially when dealing with extraordinary allegations like human
rights abuses.

256 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 252, arts. 7, 8, 22;
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 253, art. 2.
257 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 252, arts. 28, 32.
258 Id. art. 41.
259 Id. art. 41–42.
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F. Tribunal Tribulations
However, if the Framework was established in the form of a legally binding
international agreement and non-compliance can be remedied by members
bringing suit against others, perhaps it would be wise to also consider
implementing a tribunal on the international level similar to the International
Court of Justice (“ICJ”).260 Of course, making the procedure to take disputes
before an ICJ clone court mandatory will cause countries that normally opt out
of ICJ jurisdiction—regardless of its discretionary nature—to not join the
Framework, as both the United States and China have done on numerous
occasions.261
While many countries do submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the ICJ,
the absence of China’s compulsory jurisdiction may cause problems if China is
one of the countries that will be monitored by the Framework.262 Furthermore,
some of the copper and cobalt producing countries do not submit themselves to
the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ either.263 To remedy this, an exact copy
of the ICJ may need to be left off the table as the court of adjudication, instead
creating a specialized court available only to members of the Framework; the
non-affiliation with the UN may be a better selling point to these countries that
refuse to be brought before the ICJ.
However, the power of the ICJ to promulgate advisory opinions would be
beneficial to the Framework’s tribunal system in that it would not be binding
on parties in the dispute—allaying worries about compulsory jurisdiction.264
Advisory opinions serve as a fact gathering of sorts and give the disputants an
idea of how the conflict would play out in court, if it comes to that.265 Thus,
advisory opinions may prompt parties to solve the dispute through diplomatic

260

The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. The
Court, INT’L CT. JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1 (last visited Oct. 24, 2013). It was
established in June 1945 by the Charter of the United Nations and began work in April 1946. Id. The Court’s
role is to settle, in accordance with international law, legal disputes submitted to it by States and to give
advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by authorized United Nations organs and specialized
agencies. Id.
261 Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, INL’T CT. JUST., http://www.
icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3 (last visited Oct. 24, 2013); see also Treaties, INL’T CT.
JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=4 (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
262 Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, supra note 264.
263 Id.
264 Advisory Jurisdiction, INL’T CT. JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=2 (last
visited Oct. 24, 2013).
265 See id.
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means and avoid being bound by larger international law standards after a long
trial process. Also, the ICJ allows third parties to bring cases on behalf of those
claimants who do not have the resources to bring a suit before the court;266 for
the purposes of the Framework such a facet would be invaluable to its
adjudication system because many of the resource-rich countries do not have
the ability to expend the assets necessary to bring a case to an international
tribunal.267 Furthermore, miners subject to abuse may not have the means to
bring suit in court—here, NGOs could represent the interests of miners.
Other shortcomings of the ICJ itself support its exclusion as the court of
adjudication for the Framework. A losing party need not comply with the
ruling of the ICJ (thus making compliance dependent on UN Security Council
action) and though twenty-six out of thirty-two judgments on the merits have
been complied with, only half of the judgments are complied with when not
brought by special agreement and where the respondent lost.268 Furthermore,
African nations in general have been reluctant to take their claims to the ICJ.269
Despite these problems, there have been successes of the ICJ: a 1992 case
between El Salvador and Honduras over illegal immigration was brought
before the court, a border dispute that turned into a war between Mali and
Burkina Faso was resolved by the court, and Libya withdrew troops from Chad
when the ICJ ruled against it.270 Ultimately, the insufficiency of enforcement
and absence of compulsory jurisdiction leave the ICJ ineffectual against states
that do not wish to comply with the standards the court upholds.271 A trusteetype court that uses the effective aspects of the ICJ discussed above would
ensure compliance with judgments and thus better serve the Framework.272
As a step between exhausting national remedies and a purely international
court modeled on the ICJ, there should be a hybrid court within the
266

See id.
See Edwin Müller & Patricia Schneider, The ICJ 1945−2001: Empirical Findings About its
Performance and Recommendations for an Improvement of its Efficiency, 3 REV. INT’L L. & POL. 71, 86
(2007).
268 Id. at 73, 81.
269 Id. at 77.
270 Id. at 83–84.
271 Id. at 83.
272 See Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, Trustee Courts and the Judicialization of International
Regimes, 1 J. L. & COURTS 61, 62 (2013). A trustee court is the authoritative interpreter of a legal regime, has
compulsory jurisdiction, and its decisions cannot be overturned by parties. Id. Essentially, its power is that
which is not left to states to derogate. Id. at 75. Trustee courts in turn make the establishing document a “living
instrument,” which is to be interpreted dynamically. Id. at 66.
267
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adjudicatory organ of the Framework. Hybrid courts combine national and
international law to decide cases and feature judge panels of both international
and national jurists.273 Used in Sierra Leone, the former Yugoslavia, and
Rwanda—among others—hybrid courts can be successful due to their
combination of national and international law.274 The Framework is not dealing
with genocide or crimes against humanity during armed conflict as the
tribunals set up for the above examples were, but human rights abuses do fall
in the same national-international nexus, making hybrid courts an appropriate
adjudicatory organ. Such a design promotes cooperation between the two
levels of law and aides in the development of national judges to decide such
cases, usually subject matter with which these judges have not previously
dealt.
By developing national judiciaries, hybrid courts also address the
legitimacy problem that purely international courts face on the local level by
lessening the appearance of external (i.e., foreign) control over judicial
matters.275 These courts pool the resources of state judicial systems with
international tribunals, ensuring that such a court will be able to handle the
case if it becomes a long-running affair—something that will occur when
greater violations of the Framework occur.276 Additionally, this median step
between national and international adjudication will act as a safety valve for
when national courts become overburdened by complaints. One potential
complication is that to date, most ad hoc hybrid courts have dealt with crimes
during armed conflict and thus their effectiveness in non-conflict and non-ad
hoc situations has not been as comprehensively examined.277
G. A Broader Scope
Another aspect of the Framework that needs to be differentiated from the
KPCS is the subject matter. Obviously, the Framework will not deal with
diamonds (and if truly successful not be limited to only cobalt and copper), but
what is needed is expansion beyond conflict minerals—human rights abuses in
the extractive industries that concern the Framework do not necessarily take
place during armed conflict. Because the Framework will scrutinize human
rights abuses and the transparency of revenue, members will have to ensure
273
274
275
276
277

Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 298 (2003).
Id. at 295.
See id. at 301, 306, 308.
See id. at 308.
See id. at 295, for a succinct discussion on the potential of hybrid courts in more expansive situations.
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that their mineral production is not just conflict-free, but that extraction is done
in a responsible, ethical, and sustainable way. Countries like Zimbabwe and
Venezuela will be under greater scrutiny if the objectives of the Framework are
not limited to conflict circumstances but human rights problems related to
mining.
1. A Frankenstein Framework
The Framework will include parts of the KPCS and other KPCS-like
organizations that aim to accomplish such objectives as discussed in Part I of
this Comment. EITI’s flexibility and country-specific customization would be
perfect for the framework because it allows adaptability, a necessity for a
region as heterogeneous as southern Africa’s copper and cobalt belts.278
Countries with differing levels of civil society strength and development will
be able to implement the Framework and not be bound by requirements that
are untenable with current levels of institutional strength. EITI’s transparency
framework is key for an industry where many contracts between governments
and mining companies are done in secret and make it impossible to track
revenue—avoiding pitfalls like Zimbabwe and Venezuela.279 Development is
stymied in a classic case of the Resource Curse when revenue is consolidated
in the coffers of state elites and corporations, either on account of a too-weak
state or a strong, corrupt one.
2. Educating Civil Society
One part of the tripartite Framework is civil society; being one-third of the
structure, it must be strong enough to deal with the obligations of the
Framework. The saying that knowledge is power is doubly true when dealing
with human rights abuses. The International Senior Lawyers Project (“ISLP”)
would enable greater integration with civil society and governments. ISLP
assists human rights and transactional NGOs in furthering the protection of
human rights while encouraging economic development in countries
worldwide.280 If ISLP signs on as a sponsor and civil society representation,
the Framework’s civil society prong becomes immediately stronger. The

278
279
280

2013).

EITI Factsheet, supra note 129.
U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Afr., supra note 197, at 4–9.
Human Rights, INT’L SENIOR LAW. PROJECT, http://islp.org/content/human-rights (last visited Oct. 24,
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organization works with governments as well,281 a useful tool if the
Framework is to be a legal entity and not just a watchdog entity.
ISLP would benefit from a partnership with the African Legal Support
Facility (“ALSF”), an organization created in 2009 as part of the African
Development Bank.282 Though ALSF works on financial concerns, the African
expertise it brings to the table and its international state connections would be
helpful in bringing this part of the Framework together.283 Bringing the
knowledge of human rights law experts into the domestic arena at all levels of
governance will enable developing states to uphold the Framework from their
end as well—not rely predominantly on the larger international institutions
involved.
Perhaps the greatest asset ISLP brings is their local lawyer education
program. The program sends lawyers from ISLP to foreign states to teach local
lawyers various aspects of environmental, human rights, and international
law.284 With domestic lawyers that understand the legal aspects of the
Framework, states will have an easier time implementing the Framework in a
way that comports with local legal customs and societal norms. More
importantly, it empowers communities to combat noncompliance issues right
where the mines are located by giving them knowledge of their legal rights.
Using ALSF’s assets in this endeavor would strengthen the Framework.
Consequently, miners will have a better understanding that the abuses they
suffer are not merely the result of two clashing cultures, but rather a legitimate
infringement of their rights as human beings.
Educating civil society on the rights and powers they have and what they
can do to combat human rights abuses and corruption in the extraction industry
only strengthens the Framework—akin to Australia’s method of FDI and its
associated programs. A strong civil society can force the hand of a state to deal
more strictly with a multinational corporation that is exploiting its workers and
change laws that previously played to the latter’s interests, such as the case of
El Salvador in the mid-2000s.285 Furthermore, human rights abuses are lower
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Id.
U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Afr., supra note 197, at 11.
283 Goals and Objectives, AFR. DEV. BANK GROUP, http://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiativespartnerships/african-legal-support-facility/goals-and-objectives (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
284 Human Rights, supra note 284.
285 See Denis Collins, The Failure of a Socially Responsive Gold Mining MNC in El Salvador:
Ramifications of NGO Mistrust, 88 J. BUS. ETHICS 245 (2009).
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in countries that accede to a protection-type treaty and that have a strong civil
society.286
The use of experts from other countries or regions helped facilitate rural
industrial growth in China; it is a strategy that works and one that the KPCS
lacked.287 There will be less of a chance of a situation arising where workers
give up and simply try to deal with the illegal practices and dangers of a state’s
extractive industries. Additionally, educating local officials about human rights
issues and changing their incentive mindset would help stop human rights
abuses at the mines and quell corruption; it is mostly at the local levels of
government that human rights abuses and corruption often take place.288
3. Extraction-to-Market Guarantees
The Framework should also borrow the World Diamond Council’s System
of Warranties and graft it onto the cobalt and copper industries.289 The System
of Warranties ensure that diamonds are accompanied by proper invoices, a
written assurance based on personal knowledge or other legitimate written
guarantees that the diamonds are conflict-free, and an independent audit.290
This system is used in the KPCS but it has not been fully effective, as states
have forged certificates to export conflict diamonds.291 Combining the System
of Warranties with a legally binding framework as previously discussed would
strengthen the Framework’s enforcement ability; the certificates in the System
of Warranties may have been successfully counterfeited in the past, but the
threat of legitimate legal consequences—not just from the Framework’s
adjudicatory procedure but the larger international community as well—if
caught may further disincentivize smugglers and corrupt governments.
One foreseeable problem to using the System of Warranties is that it would
effectively stop once these minerals reach China’s manufacturing and
processing plants. With diamonds, the minerals did not change form from
extraction to market—though cut and refined, they are still diamonds and are

286 See Neumayer, supra note 237, at 941. However, states that accede to such a treaty but have weak civil
societies actually have more human rights abuses than the average. Id. at 946.
287 Kostka, supra note 181, at 64.
288 See Neumayer, supra note 237, at 929.
289 Conflict Diamonds, DE BEERS, http://www.debeersgroup.com/Sustainability/ethics/Conflict-diamonds
(last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
290 Id.
291 Enforcement, KIMBERLEY PROCESS, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/enforcement (last visted
Oct. 24, 2013).
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the majority of the end-product. Unfortunately, cobalt and copper are often
processed and combined with other materials when put into electronics;
furthermore, they are just a few of many other components going into the
product and largely unseen by consumers. This means to ensure that the final
product is ethically built may be more difficult. The Framework warranty
system must continue past input into the final product and attend these
electronics to their final distribution, meaning the warranty will not apply to
the minerals only but the whole product. These are international trade
considerations that are better off discussed in detail in another article. For the
purposes of this Comment, the Framework’s warranty system will cover cobalt
and copper shipments from extraction to manufacturing in a similar fashion to
the KPCS and then a secondary certificate declaring the ethical nature of the
two minerals within the final product will accompany the end product from
manufacturing to market. In doing so, consumers and retailers can be confident
that the products using these two mined materials are ethically produced.
CONCLUSION
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme is an effective framework in
curbing the trade of conflict diamonds in the world. It has been largely
successful but is by no means perfect in its enforcement or in its structure.
However, the KPCS serves as a great blueprint for creating a new framework
for ensuring ethically mined minerals—both in terms of transparency and
human rights protection—in the cobalt and copper industries. The Framework
is a response to the human rights abuses and poor working and safety
conditions that are often found at mining sites, especially those owned and
operated by Chinese companies.
With China’s presence in Africa steadily growing over the past decade, it is
only a matter of time before China is the dominant foreign player in Africa’s
mineral resource industry. The problems that have emerged in copper, cobalt,
and other mineral industries under their watch serve as a warning of what a
more economically independent China may bring to bear on Africa’s
developing states. While China’s brand of South-South investment does have
its benefits in the form of large infrastructure capital, it lacks the linkages
essential in combating the Resource Curse beyond pumping in capital; these
linkages are present in Australia’s investment strategy.
By taking the KPCS as a lesson learned, combining it with aspects of
similar frameworks that emerged to fill the gaps in the KPCS enforcement
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procedure, and grafting international law onto it, the Framework will be able to
protect actors in the cobalt and copper industries at all levels with effective and
binding authority. To ensure that extraction of these two technologically
integral minerals is conflict-free, respectful of human rights, and transparent is
no small task; however, the strength of the tripartite membership system, deep
integration into society, and legal force will enable the Framework to
effectively monitor and enforce the cobalt and copper industries.
Given cobalt and copper’s importance in so many technology industries,
especially the mobile phone and computer industries, it is integral to ensure
that these growing industries do not foster negative practices and consequences
on the human side of them. Our world is getting more dependent on
technology with each passing generation—technology that now must be
manufactured on such a scale to meet demand that only manufacturing
countries with huge manufacturing assets such as China can meet that demand.
If the world community saw the need to create the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme, shouldn’t the same be done for minerals that are much
more prevalent in society? On a day-to-day basis almost everyone—whether
for entertainment, business, or necessity—uses some piece of technology that
contains copper and cobalt. From our phones and computers to our buildings
and water pipes to our medical machines, these two minerals are ingrained in
society. Isn’t it time that we ensure that something so important to society is
brought to us as ethically as possible? Shouldn’t the process of extraction of
such important minerals benefit society not just once a product gets to market,
but when it is first dug out of the Earth?
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